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T
his paper studies the implications of the "zero-condition" for multiattribute utility theory.
The zero-condition simplifies the measurement and derivation of the Quality Adjusted Life
Year (QALY) measure commonly used in medical decision analysis. For general multiattribute
utility theory, no simple condition has heretofore been found to characterize multiplicatively
decomposable forms. When the zero-condition is satisfied, however, such a simple condition,
"standard gamble invariance," becornes available.
{QALY; Multiattribute Utility; Utility Independence)
1. Introduction
Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) provide an impor-
tant and widely applied outcome measure in medical
decision analysis. They constitute a well-founded
method for combining quality of life and life duration
into a single measure that serves as a criterion for trade-
offs in economic analyses. Their meaning and interpre-
tation is clear, and they are reasonably tractable. There
are, however, some methodological problems. QALYs
are based on a number of assumptions about utility and
individual preference that are, at best, satisfied to some
degree of approximation (Loomes and McKenzie 1989).
For a precise assessment of the usefulness of QALYs, a
deeper insight into their intrinsic meaning is warranted,
and that is the subject of this paper.
The tractability of QALY calculations is based on
three simplifying assumptions. First, utility of life du-
ration is assumed to be linear. Second, a multiplica-
tive combination of life duration and health is as-
sumed. Third, for nonchronic health states, values of
different periods with different health states are
added up. This last assumption may be the most ques-
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tionable one, but is not the subject of this paper (Jo-
hannesson 1995). Hence attention is restricted
throughout this paper to chronic health states. The
assumption of linear utility for duration is sometimes
weakened to permit discounting or risk aversion. We
consider alternative derivations of the linear and non-
linear cases of the QALY model.
It is not always recogruzed that a multiplicative com-
bination is immediately suggested by some obvious
characteristics of health preferences. First, some health
states are worse than death. Whereas most health states
are "positive" (longer life durations are preferred to
shorter ones), worse-than-death states are ones in which
the opposite is true. This inversion of preferences sug-
gests a multiplicative rule because multiplication by a
negative number produces an analogous inversion of
inequalities. A second phenomenon that reflects the
idea of multiplication concerns the "empty" life dura-
tion of 0 years. When survival duration is 0 years (the
vacuous time period), it obviously does not matter what
the state of health is. This phenomenon also suggests a
multiplicative rule because multiplication by 0 nullifies
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all differences. Below we formally define the second
phenomenon as the "zero-condition" for preference
and we study its implications.
This paper provides a derivation of QALYs that re-
flects as closely as possible the empirical phenomena
just described. Thus we obtain a characterization of the
meaning of QALYs that is more fundamental than those
provided hitherto in the literature. The characterization
reveals more plainly the critical issues in the discussions
for and against the use of QALYs. Our derivation will
also be more elementary and easier to understand than
the previous derivations. Not only do we drop the com-
monly used assumption of constant proportional trade-
offs, but also we drop the complicated assumptions of
utility independence (in the case of linear utility) or we
replace the utility independence assumption by a
weaker assumption, standard gamble invariance (in the
case of nonlinear utility for life duration). These sim-
plifications are achieved through the logical power of
the zero-condition. It is our deliberate aim that the anal-
ysis of this paper be as elementary as possible in order
to make the intrinsic meaning of QALYs as transparent
as possible.
The measurement of QALYs belongs to the general
domain of multiattribute utility (Keeney and Raiffa
1976). The QALY is a two-attribute multiplicative
utility function. Section 5 studies implications of the
zero-condition for general multiattribute utility the-
ory where there can be more than two attributes. The-
orem 5.1 provides a genera! characterization, for two
or more attributes, of multiplicative representations
when signs can change; it simplifies existing results.
Versions of the mathematical zero-condition have ap-
peared in several studies in the past. We discuss these,
and show how our theorem generalizes the existing
results.
Section 2 presents our analysis of QALYs with linear
utility for life duration. The zero-condition is introduced
and discussed. The third section extends the analysis to
nonlinear utility, allowing for general risk attitudes and
discounting. Section 4 compares our results to existing re-
sults on QALY measurement in the literature and presents
examples and further discussion. The next section consid-
ers general multiattribute utility theory. We conclude with
a brief discussion of the elementary nature of our analysis.
Formal proofs are given in an appendix.
2. QALYs under Risk Neutrality
A pair (Q, T) designates an outcome where a person
lives for T years in health state Q and then dies; i.e.,
outcomes in this paper are chronic health states. A gam-
ble is a probability distribution over chronic health
states, in other words, a gamble specifies the probabil-
ities with which different chronic states occur. We as-
sume that preferences over gambles satisfy expected
utility theory as derived by von Neumarm and Morgen-
stem (1944) and denote the utility function by U (Wein-
stein et al. 1980, Sox et al. 1986, Clemen 1991). The stan-
dard QALY model assumes risk neutrality with respect to
life duration, meaning that an uncertain lifetime of ex-
pected duration T is equally preferred to a certain life-
time of duration T when health quality is held fixed.
This assumption underlies the time tradeoff method
(defined in §4) which is widely used to measure health
quality, and it is used in Markov analyses of nonchronic
health states. The present section considers the standard
QALY model; the next section generalizes the discus-
sion to QALYs with risk aversion.
The QALY model asserts that Q and T are related as
follows:
U{Q,T)= V{Q)-T. (2.1)
In other words, the utility of duration is linear and V{Q)
represents a correction factor for health quality. Figure
1 illustrates the QALY model for a few health states.
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Two critical features of the QALY model are evident in
Figure 1. First, the utility of life duration is linear, im-
plying risk neutrality. Second, the multiplicative rela-
tionship between Q and T implies that all utility lines
radiate from the origin. Figure 1 also depicts worse-
than-death health states; their utility lines descend from
the origin. The focus of this paper is to highlight the
next preference assumption whose importance for util-
ity modeling has not been widely recognized.
Preferences satisfy the zero-condition if all health states
are equally preferred when the duration is 0. The zero-
condition means that (Q, 0) is equivalent in preference
to (Q', 0) for all health states Q, Q'. Later we will pres-
ent a more complex set of assumptions from which the
QALY model is commonly derived in the literature.
Here we point out a rather surprising result—the QALY
model is already implied by risk neutrality and the zero-
condition.
THEOREM 2.1. Under expected utility, the QALY model
holds if and only if risk neutrality and the zero-condition
hold. D
To illustrate the preference conditions. Figure 2a
shows a possible utility structure in which risk neutral-
ity is satisfied but the zero-condition is not. Obviously
for each health state Q, the utility function for survival
in Q is linear, but the functions for different Q can lie
Figure 2a Utility Functions for Life Duration, for Risk Neutrality but
without the Zero-Condition
Figure 2b QALY Utility Functions for Life Duration, for the Zero-





anywhere in the plane (Bleichrodt et al. 1997). The zero-
condition is not assumed because the utility functions
do not all coincide at T = 0. For example. Figure 2a
implies that duration 0 in health state Qi would be pre-
ferred to duration 0 in health state Q2. Figure 2b shows
a possible utility structure in which the zero-condition
is satisfied but risk neutrality is not. The utility functions
can follow any nonlinear pattern, but they must coin-
cide at T ^ 0. It is convenient to locate the common
value at the origin, and this has been done in Figure 2b.
Clearly the combination of the constraints shown in Fig-
ures 2a and 2b together yield a utility structure as in
Figure 1. This reasoning captures the proof of Theo-
rem 2.1.
A health state is positive if longer durations are pre-
ferred to shorter durations; in the QALY model this
means that V{Q) > 0. A health state is negative if shorter
durations are preferred to longer durations, which
means that V{Q) < 0 in the QALY model. Sometimes it
can be useful to incorporate health states Q for which
all life durations are equivalent in preference to imme-
diate death. Survival in such health states is neither pre-
ferred to nor less preferred than death. Such health
states will be called eqiial-to-death health states in this
paper. Equal-to-death health states are represented in
the QALY model by the valuation V{Q) = 0. Health
states that are not equal-to-death will be called uticqual-
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to-death health states. Theorem 2.1 generalizes an earlier
finding that was restricted to positive health states
{Bleichrodtetal. 1997).
The status of the zero-condition is subtle and deserves
further discussion. If it is, as we claim, completely evi-
dent, then how is it possible that this apparently vacu-
ous condition can have so many implications? To un-
derstand this point, note that in formal mathematics
there is no reason why an abstract pair (healthy, 0)
would designate the same object as an abstract pair (ill,
0). These two objects are, however, identical physical
objects in our domain of application where the second
dimension designates duration of time. This identity is
beyond empirical testing and is a logical implication of
the physical meaning of pairs (Q, T) in our domain.
Therefore, there is no medical interest in mathematical
models with differences between a pair (healthy, 0) and
(ill, 0). In summary, violations of the zero-condition are
impossible in the measurement of health outcomes.
3. QALYs without Risk Neutrality
The assumption of linear utility in the previous section
was motivated by the tractability it provides for calcu-
lations; in particular, it permits the use of the time trade-
off technique for eliciting health state utilities. It has
been used in theoretical studies by de Finetti (1937) and
Nau (1992). The assumption is not empirically realistic,
however, because it does not incorporate discounting
and risk aversion. A more realistic measure results if we
drop the assumption of linearity, leading to generalized
QALYs:
U{Q,T)=V{Q)-W{T) (3.1)
where W(0) = 0. Here W, the function that values life
duration, can be nonlinear. Figure 3 is an example of a
generalized QALY utility structure. Utility functions for
life duration have the same curvature with respect to
different health states, and they all coincide at T - 0.
The justification of this model in terms of preference
conditions becomes more complicated because risk neu-
trality can no longer be invoked here. In place of risk
neutrality, we adopt a condition on standard gambles
for life duration. Consider any health state Q and a stan-
dard gamble equivalence where (Q, T) is equal in pref-
erence toap chance of (Q, Y) and a 1 - ;? chance of (Q,
Z). We call p the probability equivalent of (Q, T) with
respect to the end points, (Q, Y) and (Q, Z). Under risk
neutrality, p equals (T - Z)/ (Y - Z), but it will be dif-
ferent under risk aversion or risk seeking. Therefore we
relax the assumption that p equals (T - Z)/(Y - Z) in
this section, but we keep the assumption that probabil-
ity equivalents are the same in different unequal-to-
death health states. That is, if Q and Q' are unequal-to-
death and p is the probability equivalent of (Q, T) with
respect to (Q, Y) and (Q, Z), then p is also the proba-
bility equivalent of (Q', T) with respect to (Q', Y) and
(Q', Z). This condition is called standard gamble invari-
ance {SG invariance). The definition of SG invariance is
restricted to unequal-to-death health states because
every duration is equivalent to every gamble for sur-
vival in an equal-to-death health state.
A remarkable feature of the multiplicative model can
be inferred from Figure 3. That is, if the commonly found
risk aversion holds for positive health states, then risk
seeking is implied for negative health states. This prop-
erty, risk aversion for positive outcomes but risk seeking
for negative outcomes, agrees well with the predictions of
prospect theory (Fishbum and Kochenberger 1979, Cur-
rim and Sarin 1989, Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
The following theorem demonstrates that tmder SG
invariance, the zero-condition has essentially the same
force as it had in the previous section.
Figure 3 QALY Utility Functions for Life Duration, for the Zero-Condition
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THEOREM 3.1. Under expected utility, the generalized
QALY model holds if and only if the zero-condition and SG
invariance hold. D
Figure 4 shows a possible utility structure in which
SG invariance is satisfied but the zero-condition is not.
All of the utility functions have the same curvature
(possibly inverted), but they have different slopes and
intercepts. The zero-condition is not satisfied because
the utility functions do not all coincide at T = 0. If the
constraint of SG invariance, depicted in Figure 4, is com-
bined with the zero-condition as depicted in Figure 2b,
then a utility structure as in Figure 3 results. This rea-
soning captures the proof of Theorem 3.1.
It is convenient to set V(H) = 1 for perfect health H
and to assume that W is increasing in life duration. Ob-
viously in the generalized QALY model, positive health
states are represented by the value V{Q) > 0, negative
health states are represented by the value V{Q) < 0, and
equal-to-death health states are represented by the
value V{Q) = 0.
4. Comparison to Existing QALY
Derivations and Discussion
The assumptions that have been invoked in tlie litera-
ture to derive QALYs and generalized QALYs have
been more complicated and therefore more difficult to
test empirically. Our comparison will focus first on the
assumptions for generalized QALYs, and then on the
assumption for (linear) QALYs.
The standard approach to deriving the generalized
QALY model is based on three assumptions. First, life
duration is utility independent from health quality meaning
that preferences between gambles for life duration in a
fixed health state are unaffected by the choice of health
state. This condition immediately implies SG invari-
ance, but it excludes the reversals of preference due to
negative health states. Indeed, one of the advantages of
SG invariance is that it is consistent with reversals of
strict preference that occur when positive and negative
health states are both present in the domain. Second,
health quality is utility independent from life duration in the
sense that preference between gambles for health qual-
ity at a fixed nonzero life duration are unaffected by the
choice of life duration. Third, the constatit proportional
tradeoff condition is adopted: For each health state Q
there exists a number q such that Y years in Q is equiv-
alent to qY years in perfect health, i.e., (Q, Y) is equiv-
alent to (perfect health, qY) for all Y. The time tradeoff
method measures the value of a health quality Q by
asking a person to state the number X of years in perfect
health that is equivalent to Y years in Q. The quotient
X/y is then used as an index of the quality of Q. The
constant proportional tradeoff condition implies the
consistency of this method in the sense that q = X/Yis
independent of the particular life duration Y. The con-
stant proportional tradeoff condition also implies the
zero-condition by substitution of Y = 0 but it is incom-
patible with negative health states. Specifically, Y years
in a negative health state is not equivalent to any du-
ration in perfect health. Thus, the first and third as-
sumptions can only be applied to positive health states.
The above three conditions plus some regularity con-
ditions imply the special case of the generalized QALY
model where all health states are positive and the utility
function for life duration is a power function (Y "-^ Y*^).
The result was first derived by Pliskin, Shepard, and
Weinstein (1980) which can be considered the first foun-
dation for QALY measurement. We explain here how
Theorem 3.1 generalizes and simplifies their result. First
note that their preference conditions imply the prefer-
ence conditions of Theorem 3.1. Therefore by Theorem
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3.1 the Pliskin et al. assumptions imply at least the gen-
eralized QALY model. It remains to be shown that, un-
der the assumptions of Pliskin et al, the utility function
for life duration is a power utility function. This follows
from a standard functional equation that is implied by
the constant proportional tradeoff condition {W{qT)
= /((?)• W(T) for unknown functions/, W; see Aczel
1966, Theorem 3.1.1.4). In this manner. Theorem 3.1 and
the functional equation yield Pliskin et al.'s result. Plis-
kin et al. also demonstrated how adding the assumption
of risk neutrality implies the model of Theorem 2.1 for
positive health states. This part of their result has
already been generalized for positive health states
by Bleichrodt et al. (1997) along the lines of Theo-
rem 2.1.
An alternative derivation of the generalized QALY
model with exponential utility for life duration instead
of power utility was provided by Joharmesson, Pliskin,
and Weinstein (1994). They assumed that discounted
life duration is available as an observable primitive that
can be used in axioms, and then extended the traditional
preference conditions of linear QALYs to discounted life
years. Thus, when the discounting of life years is known
a priori, the empirical realism of discounting can be
combined with the computational advantages of linear
QALYs. In Theorem 3.1, exponential utility for life du-
ration can be obtained by assuming that, for a fixed
unequal-to-death health state, a preference between
aambles remains unaffected if a constant life duration
is added to all life durations involved (Keeney and
Raiffa 1976, Theorem 4.15).
The conditions in Theorem 3.1 are more accessible
than the commonly adopted assumptions described
above. The zero-condition is more transparent and less
objectionable than constant proportional tradeoffs, and
SG invariance is more elementary than the two utility
independence properties. SG invariance has a clear em-
pirical meaning because it refers directly to utility elic-
itation for life duration by means of standard gambles.
The condition is logically weaker than utility indepen-
dence (and generalized utility independence, see the
next section), and thus provides more powerful mathe-
matical results. Nevertheless, it renders the derivations
more transparent because SG invariance directly im-
plies linearly related utility functions for life durations.
This reasoning suggests that SG invariance captures the
essence of generalized QALYs better than the more re-
strictive conditions that have been used before.
Similarly, the conditions in Theorem 2.1 are simpler
and more accessible than the standard assumptions for
the (linear) QALY model. It is remarkable and indica-
tive of the force of the zero-condition that of the three
standard QALY assumptions, mutual utility indepen-
dence, constant proportional tradeoffs, and risk neu-
trality, the first two can simply be dropped.
The advantage of more transparent conditions is that
they facilitate the debate on appropriateness of a model.
Because the zero-condition is unobjectionable. Theorem
2.1 shows that risk neutrality is the single crucial con-
dition for the QALY model for chronic health states and
Theorem 3.1 shows that SG invariance is the single cru-
cial condition for the multiplicative decomposition of
the generalized QALY model. As QALYs are widely
used but highly debated (Loomes and McKenzie 1989),
clarifications of their intrinsic meaning are important.
For example, the testing of utility independence of qual-
ity from quantity is difficult at a practical level (Miya-
moto and Eraker 1988). Our results show that this dif-
ficulty is not very central, as this utility independence
axiom is implied by the other conditions. Indeed, if the
utility independence of quality from duration is vio-
lated. Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 show that risk neutrality
and SG invariance must also be violated. Therefore, test-
ing utility independence of quality from duration pro-
vides an indirect test of risk neutrality and SG invari-
ance.
As a further illustration of the usefulness of Theorem
2.1, assume that the QALY model has been verified for
the health states in a specific domain, and now a new
health state Q must be incorporated into the analysis.
Theorem 2.1 shows that Q can be incorporated into the
QALY model as soon as one verifies risk neutrality with
respect to Q.
We illustrate some examples of phenomena in med-
ical decision analysis that have been raised in debates
of QALYs. Figure 5a illustrates an example of "maxi-
mum endurable time," first described by Sutherland,
Llewelynn-Thomas, Boyd, and Till (1982). The utility
functions of the health states Qi, Qi, Q4, Q5 satisfy the
QALY conditions. This is not so for the utility function
for the health state Q3. In health state Q3, utility in-
creases up to the duration M, the maximum endurable
844
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Figure 5a utility Functions for Life Duration, an Extreme Example of
Maximal Endurable Time M for Healtii State O3
life du-
ration
time, after which it decreases. Such a utility function
might occur if the individual had a goal to live at least
M years, but the accompanying health state Qs was very
hard to endure. For example, a patient once related to
us that his health state was almost intolerable, but he
wanted to live at least five more years in order to see
his son graduate from high school. The zero-condition
is obviously not violated in Figure 5a, but risk neutrality
is violated by the utility in health state Q3.
A more realistic case of maximum endurable time is
depicted in Figure 5b where utility curves are not
straight lines. Here the transition from positive to neg-
ative evaluation of life duration for health state Q3 is
more smooth. The phenomenon of maximum endurable
time constitutes a basic counterexample to the general-
ized QALY model.^ Assuming the zero-condition,
which is very natural. Theorem 3.1 implies that SG in-
variance must be violated. Indeed, consider a gamble
for life duration where the health state is fixed at Q2 and
where the certainty equivalent is M. If we replace Q2 by
Q3, then M is obviously no longer a certainty equivalent
because it is now the unique maximally preferred life
duration.
' Of course, maximum endurable time is a counterexample to the gen-
eralized QALY model only if there are other health states whose utility
is not extreme at the same value of M, e.g., if utility is strictly increasing
or decreasing in other health states.
Another empirical finding that violates the general-
ized QALY model {a fortiori, the QALY model as well)
is illustrated in Figure 6. Pauker (1976) suggested that
people might be unwilling to trade off life duration for
improved health quality if life duration were short, but
would be willing to make such tradeoffs at longer life
durations. Miyamoto and Fraker (1988) observed this
phenomenon in a subset of medical patients, and re-
ferred to it as indifference to health quality at short dura-
tions. Clearly, Figure 6 satisfies the zero-condition, so by
Theorem 3.1, SG invariance must be violated. Indeed,
the SG probability p to imply that Y is indifferent to a p
chance at X and a 1 — p chance at 0, is smaller when
health is fixed at level Qi {thenp ^^ p,) than when health
is fixed at level Q3 (then p = p^).
5. An Application to General
Multiattribute Utility
This section provides an application of the zero-
condition to general multiattribute utility theory. The-
orem 3.1 has in fact provided an elementary diagnostic
tool for characterizing multiplicative evaluations when
0 points are naturally given that can also be used in
general multiattribute utility theory.
To formally develop our result, we assume that the
preference domain is the set of simple gambles over a
Figure 5b Utility Functions for Life Duration, a More Realistic Example
of Maximal Endurable Time Mfor Health State O3
life du-
Q3 ration
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product set n"=i Aj. Elements of the product set are n-
tuples {a-i,..., a,,). The zero-condition holds for attribute
;• if there exists a 0 level Zj for that attribute, i.e., all n-
tuples that have ;th attribute equal to 2, are mutually
indifferent. One immediately observes that all n-tuples
(fl],. .., flrt) with one or more attributes at the 0 level are
equal in preference, all being equal in preference to an
n-tuple that takes the 0 level for all attributes for which
a 0 level exists.
SG invariance holds for attribute ; if an indifference
between a two-outcome gamble over attribute / and a
certain outcome of attribute /, is independent of the level
at which the other attributes are kept fixed as long as
none of the other attributes is fixed at a 0 level.
THEOREM 5.1. Let U he the von Neumann Morgensiern
utility over a product space Ai X • • • X A,,. Assume that
there exist 0 levels for attributes j = 1,..., n - I. Then SG
invariance holds for attributes j = 1, ..., n — \ if and only
if U is multiplicatively decomposable, i.e., U{xi, .. ., x^)
X • • • X U^{x,,). D
Note that the theorem does not assume any structure
on the attribute sets Aj (other than existence of 0 levels).
The theorem shows that we could also have obtained
the generalized QALY model by imposing a zero-
condition (referring to the health state "dead") and a
SG invariance condition on the health state dimension
in Theorem 3.1.
The best-known condition in multiattribute utility
theory to characterize additive or multiplicative repre-
sentations is generalized utility independence (Fish-
bum 1974, Fishburn and Keeney 1974,1975, von Stengel
1993). It imposes the following two requirements, not
only for single attributes, but also for subsets of attri-
butes:
(i) Indifferences are unaffected by levels at which at-
tributes are kept fixed.
(ii) Preferences are either unaffected or reversed if a
nonzero level at which attributes are kept fixed is
changed into another nonzero level.
The condition implies that the representation is either
additive or multiplicative. For the special case of addi-
tive representability, a convenient preference condition
was introduced by Fishburn (1965), the so-called "mar-
ginality" condition, requiring that the value of a gamble
over n-tuples depend only on the marginal probabilities
generated over the single attributes. To the best of our
knowledge, no very simple preference axiom exists yet
for the characterization of the multiplicative model. Let
us also mention that, in general, the restriction of gen-
eralized utility independence to single attributes is
weaker and orrly implies a "general multilinear" rep-
resentation (Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
The above theorem has shown that the implications of
the zero-condition are also remarkable in this general con-
text of multiattribute utility. As soon as the zero-condition
holds for n - I attributes, the following points hold true:
(1) Generalized utility independence implies the
multiplicative model.
(2) The somewhat complicated point (ii) of general-
ized utility independence can be dropped.
(3) Point (i) of generalized utility independence can
be restricted to the case where one gamble has two out-
comes, and the other gamble is riskless; that is, the con-
dition can be weakened to SG invariance.
The most remarkable point is:
(4) Generalized utility independence and the weaker
SG invariance only need to be imposed on single attri-
butes and not on subsets of attributes.^
In the common case where attribute domains are in-
tervals and continuity holds, the zero-condition is au-
tomatically satisfied under the multiplicative model if
attributes can be subject to sign reversals. Next we dis-
cuss some results in general utility theory that are re-
lated to Theorem 5.1. The zero-condition is a natural
mathematical property that has occurred in several
areas. One example is an impressive study of poly-
nomial representations in Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and
Tversky (1971, Chapter 7, see the set S" in Definition
7.3). Their model does not consider gambles and in-
vokes more complicated technical conditions than re-
quired for multiattribute utility. Another example is Pe-
ters (1992, Theorem 11.16), where "simultaneous bar-
gaining games" are studied.
A result, similar to Theorem 3.1 (hence, restricted to
the n = 2 case), appeared in Miyamoto and Eraker
(1988, Theorem 1). The main difference between their
axioms and ours lies in several technical conditions that
^ Moreover, it need not be imposed on the last attribute in Theorem
5.1.
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they impose on the utility function. Their Postulate 3
asserts that utility for life duration is continuous, or has
at most finitely many discontinuities, and their main
theorem assumes that life durations are drawn from a
bounded interval. Their Postulate 5 then describes stan-
dard gamble invariance for equal-chance gambles (their
formulation excludes health states equivalent to death),
and their Postulate 4 is the zero-condition. Our Theorem
5.1 generalizes their result by permitting n > 2, permit-
ting domains that are not intervals, permitting equal-to-
death health states, and avoiding continuity assump-
tions.
A zero-condition for 7i = 2 appeared in Fishbum and
Rubinstein (1982). They consider two-dimensional ob-
jects [x, t) where x designates an amount of money and
t the point in time at which x is received. Formally, their
first attribute (money) plays a role similar to that of time
in our framework, rather than their second attribute
(time). Thus, their version of a zero-condition applies
to money {x = 0) rather than time. The result closest to
our theorem is stated informally in their paper after
their Lemma 1, where the zero-condition is used im-
plicitly to derive a "Thomsen condition." They assume
that money is isomorphic to a real interval, and that
time is either discrete or isomorphic to a real interval.
They also assume full-force utility independence of
money from time, implying that there are no negative
or 0 utility values for time. They then show that the
zero-condition for money implies a representation U{x,
0 = P(0[/(^) ~/{0)] + c. Subtracting the constant c and
defining Ui(.v) = f{x) - /(O) and L/.CO = p{t). we see
that they have established a multiplicative representa-
tion. Fishbum and Rubinstein formulate an explicit
multiplicative result in their Theorem 4(iii), but that re-
sult is less general than the one just described because
further monotonicity and continuity' conditions are im-
posed. They also propose an alternative Condition B3,
that either reduces to the classical full-force utility in-
dependence condition if there are no negative attributes
(in which case it reduces to well-known results of Kee-
ney and Raiffa 1976), or implies the zero-condition in
which case it reduces to the above results. Thus our The-
orem 5.1 generalizes their result by permitting n > 2,
permitting negative valuations for the second attribute,
and avoiding assumptions of interval domains (and
continuity).
Next, let us consider the impact of the zero-condition
on the propagation of independence conditions from
subsets of attributes to their unions and intersections.
Fishbum and Keeney (1975), von Stengel (1993), and
others demonstrated that, if two overlapping subsets of
attributes have certain utility independence properties,
then these extend to their union, intersection, differ-
ences, etc. These studies did not invoke a zero-condition
and thus, utility independence conditions could not be
extended from disjoint subsets of attributes to their
unions (von Stengel 1993, Counterexample 9). The case
is different in the presence of the zero-condition.
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Assume that a subset A of attributes satisfies a SG invari-
ance condition and a zero-condition in the sense that, if
its attributes are fixed at some 0 level, then the attributes
outside of A do not affect preference.^ Assume that the
same assumptions hold for a subset B of attributes
where B is disjoint from A. By Theorem 3.1 (with A in
the role of first coordinate and the complementary event
A^ in the role of second coordinate), the utility function
can be decomposed as UAI^A'- Next we can adopt the
zero-condition for B and SG invariance for B to decom-
pose UA'= into UBU^AuBf- The result is the multiplicative
decomposition U = UAUBU^AUBY- From this multiplica-
tive decomposition, SG invariance follows for A U B;
also the zero-condition for A U B is implied by the zero-
condition for A (and also by the zero-condition for B).
In summary, in the presence of the zero-condition, SG
invariance extends from A and B to their disjoint union.
One of the main advantages of the zero condition is
its simplicity. Indeed, when it is true as in the QALY
domain, one can verify its truth in a moment's reflection
without an elaborate procedure. The advantage of hav-
ing such a condition is much Hke that of Fishbum's
(1965) marginality condition for additive utility. In fact,
the violation of marginality has been invoked to show
that QALY utilities are nonadditive: One would prefer
an even chance gamble between (1 year, poor health)
and (25 years, excellent health) to an even chance gam-
ble between (1 year, excellent health) and (25 years,
poor health). The zero condition and marginality pro-
vide diagnostics for utility models that can be tested
through thought experiments.
6. Conclusion
This paper has provided conditions for testing and iden-
tifying the appropriateness of the QALY measure for
health outcomes. The zero-condition, which is self-
evident in health utility applications, leads to a tremen-
dous simplification of existing derivations of QALYs.
The zero-condition also leads to substantial simplifica-
tions of multiplicative representations in general mul-
tiattribute utility theory.




PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1. Necessity of the conditions is obvious. For
sufficiency, first note that risk neutrality implies that for every health
state Q the utility function for life duration is linear, so is of the form
V{Q)-T + AiQ), where V{Q) and A(Q) depend on Q but are inde-
pendent of T; this is illustrated in Figure 2a. The zero-condition implies
that UiQ, 0) = U{Q', 0), hence AiQ) = A{Q') for aU Q and Q'. It is
well known that one is free to subtract a constant from a von Neumann
Morgenstem utility function, hence let us redefine U such that A{Q)
^ 0 for all Q. {Note here that the constant that one subtracts should
be the same for all (Q, T) so in particular should be independent of
Q.) The QALY model UiQ,T)= V(Q)-rfoUows immediately. D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. Necessity of the preference conditions for
the generalized QALY model follows from substitution. Hence we as-
sume the preference conditions and derive the generalized QALY
model. All equal-to-death chronic health states are equivalent, and we
may assume that utility is zero at those. Setting V(Q) = 0 provides the
generalized QALY formula for these. Next we consider iinequal-to-
death health states Q. Fix any such health state H (e.g., perfect health),
and write W(7) = U(H, T) for all life durations 7. For any unequal-
to-death health state Q, all standard gamble equivalences between (Q,
T') and gambles yielding {Q, T) with probability p and (Q, S) with
probability 1 - p are the same as for H. Hence there exist numbers
V(Q) and A{Q) so that U(Q, T) = \^(Q)W(T) -n AiQ). where V{Q)
can be positive or negative. AiQ) = 0 follows as in the proof of The-
orem 2.1 (it is also imposed here by the convention that U be 0 at
equal-to-death health states). The generalized QALY model fol-
lows. D
REMARK Al. The result of Theorem 3.1 is also mathematically cor-
rect if we permit values T < 0. It does not invoke any structure on the
set of time points (or health states) other than existence of a T = 0
level. That was the only assumption used in the proof.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1. Again, SG invariance easily follows from
the representation. So we assume SG invariance for attributes / = 1,
..., n - I and derive the representation.
It was explained in the text that all n-tuples (ni, ..., a,,) for which
at least one attribute is at the 0 level are equal in preference. Hence we
can set the von Neumann Morgenstem utility function U equal to 0
whenever any attribute attains a 0 level, and that is what we will as-
sume henceforth.
First consider the product set Ai x •• • x A,, as a two-fold product
A] X {A2 X • • • X An). To this two-fold product set we will apply
Theorem 3.1. As the zero-condition also holds for attribute 1 in this
two-fold product, only the SG invariance condition remains to be ver-
ified. Assume that the "second coordinate" (rt^, •• • / *iii) is fixed at a
level that is nonzero in the sense of the two-fold product, i.e., prefer-
ence is affected by the first coordinate di in (ui, a2, ..., a,,). Then ob-
viously none of the values 02, ..., a,, can be a 0 level in the n dimen-
sional product Al X • • X An. Therefore SG invariance in the 11 di-
mensional product Al X • • • X An implies SG invariance in the
two-fold product A, X (Aj X X An). We can now invoke Theorem
3.1 and Remark Al and conclude that
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U(fl,, a., ..., a.,) = U,(fl
Note that in the proof of Theorem 3.1, a constant was subtracted from
the utiiity function U to obtain the multiplicative form. Here, however,
such a constant need not be subtracted anymore because we have
already set U equal to 0 when attributes take their 0 level. This com-
ment also applies to subsequent steps in the proof, where again The-
orem 3.1 will be invoked but no constant needs to be added to or
subtracted from U.
The proof of the theorem now proceeds by fixing «, at any nonzero
level, say bi, and studying the preference relation over the n ~ \ di-
mensional space [b-i] X Az x • • • x A,,. We may assume that Uj{bi)
> 0, otherwise we replace U-i by -L/| and Wby -W. On the n - }
dimensional space, expected utility holds with W(a2,..., a,,) as utility
function. Here we can again apply Theorem 3.1, as was done before
(now consider the two-dimensional product Aj x ({f7|) x A3 x • • • x
A,,)), to obtain
W((72, fla fl,,) = a;(fl2) X W^(fl3 fl,,).
Thus we can proceed, after n - 1 steps the decomposition L7(fli, ..,,
fl,,) = (ii{rti).1/2(112).-• •l/,,-iK_i),W**((i,,) results, and we write U,.
= W** to obtain the multiplicative representation in the theorem. D
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